Moderator: Community Team
BigBallinStalin wrote:Metsfanmax wrote:BigBallinStalin wrote:Suppose the speaker of the video wished to be a woman, but couldn't afford the operation and years of speech therapy.
Does this mean he/she doesn't have free will?
Or are financial/physical constraints distinct from free will?
If financial, physical, mental, etc. constraints are distinct from free will, then people have free will. Everyone is limited in some way when it comes to some imagined alternative life we can have (different job, banging scarlett johanson, not 100% control over one's brain/consciousness, etc.), but that's how the world is.
It's not deterministic, in that you could never bang scarlett johanson. If that was your goal, some people are capable of taking that opportunity through much planning and difficult work (other people might not have to face such a high barrier). This doesn't mean they we have 'different' free wills.
Free will is about making choices. The opposite--in my opinion--is the denial of choice. For example, the government attempts to prohibit you from exercising your choice when it comes to illegal drugs, settling outside of court with criminals, etc.
If free will is about making choices, then it doesn't matter what the range of possible choices is, as long as a person is capable of making a choice. I may be physically restrained in a state prison cell, but they can't stop me from making choices. If I believe I have free will even though I do not have a rocket with which I can go the moon and so I am stuck on the prison that is planet Earth, similarly I would believe that I have free will even though I am stuck in the prison that is Sing Sing. The debate about free will is really a question about whether we make choices at all, or whether everything we think and say is the inevitable result of our environment.
RE: un-underlined, or rather "derlined," as it were.
There's natural constraints (can't jump 20 feet), and then there's externally imposed constraints by other humans. I'm worried about the latter in matters of "free will."
If everything was the result of our environment (i.e. exogenous), then why do the decisions "those who make no choices" influence the environment, which then influences others? It's not unidirectional; it's reciprocal. It's endogenous, so I can't side with those think similar to the underlined.
That's not what most people mean by free will. You can be talking about rights, or political freedoms, but whether or not you can make real choices isn't affected by whether the constraints are imposed by chance of nature or by intention of other humans. What is the meaningful difference?
BigBallinStalin wrote:So, you didn't really choose to respond? Then what did you just do--or rather, how did you do it? (remember not to choose your words as you type your next response).
I like Haggis' focus on the POV--i.e. within the system v. outside of the system. And still, the process is endogenous, so the unidirectional claim about environment influencing us is false.
That's not what most people mean by free will. You can be talking about rights, or political freedoms, but whether or not you can make real choices isn't affected by whether the constraints are imposed by chance of nature or by intention of other humans. What is the meaningful difference?
crispybits wrote:Even if those natural constraints are such that we never have any option but to do whatever we think we're "choosing" to do? That's like saying "here's a menu for your dinner, I'm giving you a lot of choice" and the menu only has one dish on it.
Metsfanmax wrote:BigBallinStalin wrote:So, you didn't really choose to respond? Then what did you just do--or rather, how did you do it? (remember not to choose your words as you type your next response).
I like Haggis' focus on the POV--i.e. within the system v. outside of the system. And still, the process is endogenous, so the unidirectional claim about environment influencing us is false.
You are operating under the assumption that actions can meaningfully be attributed to a person in the fully deterministic model. I contend that they cannot. To speak about something a person is "doing" in a world where they don't make any choices is farcical, because the person is no longer outside the system. You can only be outside of the system if you have free will.
Also, I'm starting to get tired of your arrogant and rude responses. The next time you do that, I'm probably just going to foe you again, and leave it there this time.
You seemed to make an argument that human constraints matter for free will whereas natural constraints do not. I asked why there is any meaningful difference between the two, that is, to justify your assertion.
crispybits wrote:The analogy was throwaway, the point is that you're assuming that such a thing as a "choice" exists. Can you give me an example of how we could separate an event (the choice) from the causal chain which precedes it, without just diving into random chance and percentage probabilities? If we can't, and the choice is entirely causal and/or random rather than self-directed then it is not a choice at all. Theoretically you can assume far advanced technology and increased knowledge of neuroscience, etc. It doesn't have to be realistic with current tech/knowledge.
BigBallinStalin wrote:Metsfanmax wrote:BigBallinStalin wrote:So, you didn't really choose to respond? Then what did you just do--or rather, how did you do it? (remember not to choose your words as you type your next response).
I like Haggis' focus on the POV--i.e. within the system v. outside of the system. And still, the process is endogenous, so the unidirectional claim about environment influencing us is false.
You are operating under the assumption that actions can meaningfully be attributed to a person in the fully deterministic model. I contend that they cannot. To speak about something a person is "doing" in a world where they don't make any choices is farcical, because the person is no longer outside the system. You can only be outside of the system if you have free will.
Also, I'm starting to get tired of your arrogant and rude responses. The next time you do that, I'm probably just going to foe you again, and leave it there this time.
It's rude of me to say that your unidirectional claim is false? You haven't demonstrated otherwise, so hopefully you'll deal with it maturely.
Is it rude of me to ask you in a tongue-and-cheek manner to contradict yourself? You still are, so then what? You're angry at me because you've cornered yourself into your own contradiction? People got pissed at Socrates for asking questions, so please don't act like them.
Recently, you've sidestepped with a "oh, language doesn't matter in the deterministic model" and "assume fully deterministic model is true; therefore, your contention is false." The latter position is as false as all theological arguments which start with, 'assume God exists', so let's move on. Language does matter (i.e. subjectively defining oneself, human action, and the environment within which we operate), and this goes back to Haggis' distinction between "within the system" and "outside of the system." You're focused on a philosophical problem which has no bearing within our actual world--other than the meaning which you attribute to your deterministic model within this world (even language--i.e. the fundamental means through which your actions become meaningfully attributed to your person--make your model seemingly relevant to this world). In other words, "within the system" you use such means--within the system--to imagine something "outside of the system," but still it's not there. There is no "outside of the system." It's a language muddle, as Wittgenstein puts it.
Metsfanmax wrote:Finally, I don't really know what you mean to imply by saying I'm focused on a philosophical problem. The entire discussion of free will is a purely abstract philosophical discussion, because regardless of whatever else is true, I feel like I make actual choices, even if I know rationally that this is not the case.
BigBallinStalin wrote:crispybits wrote:The analogy was throwaway, the point is that you're assuming that such a thing as a "choice" exists. Can you give me an example of how we could separate an event (the choice) from the causal chain which precedes it, without just diving into random chance and percentage probabilities? If we can't, and the choice is entirely causal and/or random rather than self-directed then it is not a choice at all. Theoretically you can assume far advanced technology and increased knowledge of neuroscience, etc. It doesn't have to be realistic with current tech/knowledge.
Well, wait a minute. Can you answer the questions, so I can understand where you're going with this?
So, when do you never have any option but one? And in such a circumstance, why do you have no alternatives?(if there's no answer to this, then your previous contention can be discarded).
(Is your answer, "well there are no choices," which is similar to saying, "these aren't the droids you're looking for"? It doesn't work, but we'll go down that road if you like, but it depends on how you answer the following questions).
(recall, the person thinking about leaving their job)
Are such people correct in the perception of their set of options?
Do they define their own choices?
Does "the environment" actually constrain them, or do they constrain themselves?**recall tidbit on locus of control.
approach/methodology
So, your future path and your current options can be constrained by your own perception, as well as by the fundamental constraints (you might not be a mathematical genius, or have Y-colored skin, or whatever).
Because of these given variables, does this mean you have no free will?
Are we missing out other variables?
Have we explained the process of decision-making and outcomes correctly?(I ask these questions because I have no idea what you're looking for. How do you determine if our system is free will or deterministic? How do you know that "choice" does not exist? What's your criteria for knowing/demonstrating? Etc. etc. etc.)
Causality and self-directed actions aren't exclusive, so the underlined doesn't make sense. What are you asking for? I can give theories which explain processes, but I need context from you, so that I can best apply its relevance to our conversation.
Woodruff wrote:Metsfanmax wrote:Finally, I don't really know what you mean to imply by saying I'm focused on a philosophical problem. The entire discussion of free will is a purely abstract philosophical discussion, because regardless of whatever else is true, I feel like I make actual choices, even if I know rationally that this is not the case.
While I agree with you regarding it being a primarily philosophical discussion (which I enjoy), I don't understand how you could actually know that's not the case.
Metsfanmax wrote:BigBallinStalin wrote:Metsfanmax wrote:BigBallinStalin wrote:So, you didn't really choose to respond? Then what did you just do--or rather, how did you do it? (remember not to choose your words as you type your next response).
I like Haggis' focus on the POV--i.e. within the system v. outside of the system. And still, the process is endogenous, so the unidirectional claim about environment influencing us is false.
You are operating under the assumption that actions can meaningfully be attributed to a person in the fully deterministic model. I contend that they cannot. To speak about something a person is "doing" in a world where they don't make any choices is farcical, because the person is no longer outside the system. You can only be outside of the system if you have free will.
Also, I'm starting to get tired of your arrogant and rude responses. The next time you do that, I'm probably just going to foe you again, and leave it there this time.
It's rude of me to say that your unidirectional claim is false? You haven't demonstrated otherwise, so hopefully you'll deal with it maturely.
Is it rude of me to ask you in a tongue-and-cheek manner to contradict yourself? You still are, so then what? You're angry at me because you've cornered yourself into your own contradiction? People got pissed at Socrates for asking questions, so please don't act like them.
No, it is rude to suggest that I did not think about what I was saying before I said it.Recently, you've sidestepped with a "oh, language doesn't matter in the deterministic model" and "assume fully deterministic model is true; therefore, your contention is false." The latter position is as false as all theological arguments which start with, 'assume God exists', so let's move on. Language does matter (i.e. subjectively defining oneself, human action, and the environment within which we operate), and this goes back to Haggis' distinction between "within the system" and "outside of the system." You're focused on a philosophical problem which has no bearing within our actual world--other than the meaning which you attribute to your deterministic model within this world (even language--i.e. the fundamental means through which your actions become meaningfully attributed to your person--make your model seemingly relevant to this world). In other words, "within the system" you use such means--within the system--to imagine something "outside of the system," but still it's not there. There is no "outside of the system." It's a language muddle, as Wittgenstein puts it.
You have misunderstood my position. I was not arguing about whether the deterministic model was true, I had not taken a stance on that yet. I was simply making some statements about what would be the case if the deterministic model were true. Whether or not my conclusions about this are true, is independent of whether the deterministic model is correct.
You have also misunderstood my position about the nature of "being in the system." I was agreeing that there is no "outside of the system," but I contend that people who believe in free will (e.g. you, evidently) do in fact believe in that -- because it suggests that the mind does not exist in the same realm as the physical laws that govern the activity of the brain (I don't believe the emergence argument disproves this).
Finally, I don't really know what you mean to imply by saying I'm focused on a philosophical problem. The entire discussion of free will is a purely abstract philosophical discussion, because regardless of whatever else is true, I feel like I make actual choices, even if I know rationally that this is not the case.
BigBallinStalin wrote:Then what position would you like to argue in favor for?
Metsfanmax wrote:BigBallinStalin wrote:Then what position would you like to argue in favor for?
None. I haven't the slightest inkling of what the mind is. I am baffled every day by the fact that "I" exist, and that "I" have thoughts. I am literally unable to wrap my mind around what my mind is. So I don't really think I have any justification for trying to go and make statements about how it works. I am just evaluating the consequences of the hypotheses that were proposed here.
BigBallinStalin wrote:Anyway, as a rehash, which hypothesis do you find to be the most convincing and why?
crispybits wrote:You never have any option except one. That's kinda the point.
crispybits wrote:Our consciousness creates an illusion of choice when in reality the laws of physics make the choice for us, and then we just catch up and convince ourselves we've done it.
crispybits wrote:Lets try a different analogy (and remember these aren't meant to be taken 100% literally, they're figurative):
Assume:
x = 1034
y = 2142
z = 523
Calculate 469xy + 342xz + 610yz using only a pen and paper and long multiplication - no calculators or other artifical aids.
Now the answer to that question is always going to be 1,907,064,036. It's the answer even before you start conciously working it out. But your brain doesn't have the knowledge of the answer, so it has to work it's way through it and get to the answer at the end.
crispybits wrote:It's sort of the same with choices. Causality/quantum has already determined what the decision you will make to a particular set of apparent options is at any given point in time. You can no more change that decision than you can change the answer of the maths problem during the process of working it out. Studies have shown that the brain makes this decision away from the concious thought processes, and the concious thought processes then catch up some time afterwards.
crispybits wrote:Given that you have no concious control over which option you will decide, the fact that you can convince yourself that you do is irrelevant. I could convince myself that I'm really good at beer pong, but that act of self-persuasion has no bearing on whether I am objectively any good at beer pong.
crispybits wrote:So to get to the answers for your questions:
Are such people correct in their perception of their set of options? They are correct in the way that they can perceive a set of possibilities, however these are not options, they are simply things that it would be possible for this to happen. Just like it is possible that I could get up from my computer right now, go into the shop downstairs and beat up the shop assistant. That doesn't mean that they have a choice between those options, simply that this is a list of things that are viable possibilities that could conceivably happen.
crispybits wrote:Do they define their own choices? They define what they think are decisions they are making. They are incorrect in classifying them as choices, because whatever they think about the decisions they think they are making, actually their decision was made at the start of the causal chain (however far you want to trace that back), and it was not a concious choice but merely a natural event governed by the laws of physics.
crispybits wrote:Does the environment constrain them? Reality constrains them. Reality constrains itself. They can never do anything other than what the causal chain leads them to do, even if they believe they are self-directed actors making their own decisions.
crispybits wrote:As I said, can you give me an example where the act of making a decision is not based on the causal chain that ends in the firing of certain neurons in the brain, and sometime after that by the illusion that we have conciously chosen one option over another?
Metsfanmax wrote:BigBallinStalin wrote:Anyway, as a rehash, which hypothesis do you find to be the most convincing and why?
Everything that scientists have learned so far points to the idea that the rules of nature can be expressed in a form that humans can understand, and that the form is completely deterministic. So the most convincing argument, to me, is that everything humans do could in principle be calculated, given the state of the universe before the action at sufficient precision, and sufficient computing power.
BigBallinStalin wrote:Metsfanmax wrote:BigBallinStalin wrote:Anyway, as a rehash, which hypothesis do you find to be the most convincing and why?
Everything that scientists have learned so far points to the idea that the rules of nature can be expressed in a form that humans can understand, and that the form is completely deterministic. So the most convincing argument, to me, is that everything humans do could in principle be calculated, given the state of the universe before the action at sufficient precision, and sufficient computing power.
Sure, and maybe there is a Higher Being. To me, both of those claims are similar, but hey perhaps there are constants in the social sciences (so far there are none).
Regarding computational power:
http://castroller.com/Podcasts/MisesIns ... ia/2847715
That's an interesting audio. It's about the Venus Project and its inability to address knowledge and incentive problems via a "scientific method" for allocating resources based on preferences and so on.
When I look at the mathematical aspect of social science today, I really doubt that "everything humans do could in principle be calculated." If you could have something like google and facebook, which monitors all of their users' activities, then maybe, but you'd still be working with only correlations at that point. The little I know of neuroscience looks promising, but I'm just not a convinced believer in your stated possibilities.
What do you mean by "the form is completely deterministic"? Could you give an example?
BBS wrote:I am presented with two options on a broad level at this time: (1) continue reading, or (2) ignore your post. Apparently, I have more than one option. After some time of deliberating between the two choices, I chose (1).
crispybits wrote:Indeed - it feels like we're talking past each other to an extent.
Let me try to re-state another definition of free will and lets see if you can agree with that and lets take it from there:
Free will is the ability of an agent to act without the constraint of necessity and at their own discretion.
Necessity in this definition would include causal interactions such as the fact you have enjoyed strawberry ice cream more than chocolate ice cream in the past would mean that if given the "choice" between strawberry and chocolate ice cream you will choose strawberry in the future (assuming that "choice" is based solely on which you enjoy more and ignoring other factors like peer pressure of all your friends ordering chocolate, a recent glut of strawberry ice cream desserts meaning the chocolate would seem nice for a change, etc)
crispybits wrote:(assuming that "choice" is based solely on which you enjoy more and ignoring other factors like peer pressure of all your friends ordering chocolate, a recent glut of strawberry ice cream desserts meaning the chocolate would seem nice for a change, etc)
Return to Practical Explanation about Next Life,
Users browsing this forum: No registered users