Conquer Club

tzor wrote:Unfortunately, the start of the game was delayed two minutes while the booth announcers asked if anyone from the stands would help out with the chain gang. Once the game was ready the game began.

tzor wrote:It soon became apparent that the one part of American football the Monarchs had not really covered was in the kicking. At first, it seemed bold and brilliant for them to always try to make a play on the fourth down, as opposed to punting the ball.

tzor wrote:Not bad, for a team that can't kick the ball.

Army of GOD wrote:how close are you to Bethpage?

Punting has been a part of football since the game’s earliest days, but it was long considered so unimportant that teams simply trained safeties or running backs to do the task. The professionalization of punting arrived in the seventies, when the Oakland Raiders selected Ray Guy, a punter, in the first round of the N.F.L. draft. (It’s fitting that Al Davis made this choice, the only such selection in draft history; he later took Sebastian Janikowski, a kicker, with the seventeenth overall pick.) Today, their presence is expected and well remunerated. Punters and kickers now make, on average, more than tight ends. Shane Lechler—again, of the Raiders—earns $3.8 million a year. Lechler punted seventy-eight times last year, meaning the Raiders shelled out nearly fifty thousand dollars for each time he stepped on the field.


Yet there is growing statistical evidence to suggest that paying punters at all is, at best, a misallocation of salary-capped funds and, at worst, counterproductive. The Times recently cited a paper by David Romer (PDF), a professor of political economy at the University of California at Berkeley, that has become “the gospel for the antipunting faction.” Romer’s determination, after studying punt data from 1998 to 2004, was that teams should never punt when facing fourth down with less than four yards to go for the first, regardless of where they are on the field. Other analysis has suggested that teams should never punt from inside their opponent’s forty-yard line. As a corollary, they should always go for a touchdown, rather than a field goal, from inside the five-yard line.


And yet football teams continue to do the opposite. Those attempting to put the data into action are stuck, for now, in the lower ranks of the game. The archetype for non-punting football has become a high-school team in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Pulaski Academy Bruins do not return punts (fumbles and penalties outweigh big returns, they say), they perform onside kicks after almost every score, and they never, ever punt. Last season, they went undefeated and won the state title. But coaches at higher levels have been slow to buy in to their system. San Diego State coach Rocky Long has said he might consider going for it on fourth down once his offense crosses midfield this season, but he’s an exception, and there are few others. Anyone that tries it puts himself at risk. In 2009, Bill Belichick opted not to punt on fourth down from his own twenty-eight-yard line, late in the game, with his team leading by six points. The statisticians came to Belichick’s defense when the play failed and the Patriots lost, but he was still roundly mocked, stats be damned. This is common. Once, when the Pulaski Bruins actually did punt, their own fans gave them a standing ovation.

Symmetry wrote:THE CASE AGAINST PUNTING

Seems like a good idea generally to not punt on the 4th down.

Punting has been a part of football since the game’s earliest days, but it was long considered so unimportant that teams simply trained safeties or running backs to do the task. The professionalization of punting arrived in the seventies, when the Oakland Raiders selected Ray Guy, a punter, in the first round of the N.F.L. draft. (It’s fitting that Al Davis made this choice, the only such selection in draft history; he later took Sebastian Janikowski, a kicker, with the seventeenth overall pick.) Today, their presence is expected and well remunerated. Punters and kickers now make, on average, more than tight ends. Shane Lechler—again, of the Raiders—earns $3.8 million a year. Lechler punted seventy-eight times last year, meaning the Raiders shelled out nearly fifty thousand dollars for each time he stepped on the field.


Yet there is growing statistical evidence to suggest that paying punters at all is, at best, a misallocation of salary-capped funds and, at worst, counterproductive. The Times recently cited a paper by David Romer (PDF), a professor of political economy at the University of California at Berkeley, that has become “the gospel for the antipunting faction.” Romer’s determination, after studying punt data from 1998 to 2004, was that teams should never punt when facing fourth down with less than four yards to go for the first, regardless of where they are on the field. Other analysis has suggested that teams should never punt from inside their opponent’s forty-yard line. As a corollary, they should always go for a touchdown, rather than a field goal, from inside the five-yard line.


And yet football teams continue to do the opposite. Those attempting to put the data into action are stuck, for now, in the lower ranks of the game. The archetype for non-punting football has become a high-school team in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Pulaski Academy Bruins do not return punts (fumbles and penalties outweigh big returns, they say), they perform onside kicks after almost every score, and they never, ever punt. Last season, they went undefeated and won the state title. But coaches at higher levels have been slow to buy in to their system. San Diego State coach Rocky Long has said he might consider going for it on fourth down once his offense crosses midfield this season, but he’s an exception, and there are few others. Anyone that tries it puts himself at risk. In 2009, Bill Belichick opted not to punt on fourth down from his own twenty-eight-yard line, late in the game, with his team leading by six points. The statisticians came to Belichick’s defense when the play failed and the Patriots lost, but he was still roundly mocked, stats be damned. This is common. Once, when the Pulaski Bruins actually did punt, their own fans gave them a standing ovation.

Army of GOD wrote:

Symmetry wrote:THE CASE AGAINST PUNTING

Seems like a good idea generally to not punt on the 4th down.

Punting has been a part of football since the game’s earliest days, but it was long considered so unimportant that teams simply trained safeties or running backs to do the task. The professionalization of punting arrived in the seventies, when the Oakland Raiders selected Ray Guy, a punter, in the first round of the N.F.L. draft. (It’s fitting that Al Davis made this choice, the only such selection in draft history; he later took Sebastian Janikowski, a kicker, with the seventeenth overall pick.) Today, their presence is expected and well remunerated. Punters and kickers now make, on average, more than tight ends. Shane Lechler—again, of the Raiders—earns $3.8 million a year. Lechler punted seventy-eight times last year, meaning the Raiders shelled out nearly fifty thousand dollars for each time he stepped on the field.


Yet there is growing statistical evidence to suggest that paying punters at all is, at best, a misallocation of salary-capped funds and, at worst, counterproductive. The Times recently cited a paper by David Romer (PDF), a professor of political economy at the University of California at Berkeley, that has become “the gospel for the antipunting faction.” Romer’s determination, after studying punt data from 1998 to 2004, was that teams should never punt when facing fourth down with less than four yards to go for the first, regardless of where they are on the field. Other analysis has suggested that teams should never punt from inside their opponent’s forty-yard line. As a corollary, they should always go for a touchdown, rather than a field goal, from inside the five-yard line.


And yet football teams continue to do the opposite. Those attempting to put the data into action are stuck, for now, in the lower ranks of the game. The archetype for non-punting football has become a high-school team in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Pulaski Academy Bruins do not return punts (fumbles and penalties outweigh big returns, they say), they perform onside kicks after almost every score, and they never, ever punt. Last season, they went undefeated and won the state title. But coaches at higher levels have been slow to buy in to their system. San Diego State coach Rocky Long has said he might consider going for it on fourth down once his offense crosses midfield this season, but he’s an exception, and there are few others. Anyone that tries it puts himself at risk. In 2009, Bill Belichick opted not to punt on fourth down from his own twenty-eight-yard line, late in the game, with his team leading by six points. The statisticians came to Belichick’s defense when the play failed and the Patriots lost, but he was still roundly mocked, stats be damned. This is common. Once, when the Pulaski Bruins actually did punt, their own fans gave them a standing ovation.

This is interesting. I wonder if coaches know about this and whether or not this affects their decisions to go for it on 4th down, punt or kick a field goal.

Though, the bad thing about the statistics is that they generalize instead of accounting for (what I'd imagine to be) intangible effects such as injuries, offensive strengths of teams, etc.

Symmetry wrote:THE CASE AGAINST PUNTING

Seems like a good idea generally to not punt on the 4th down.

Punting has been a part of football since the game’s earliest days, but it was long considered so unimportant that teams simply trained safeties or running backs to do the task. The professionalization of punting arrived in the seventies, when the Oakland Raiders selected Ray Guy, a punter, in the first round of the N.F.L. draft. (It’s fitting that Al Davis made this choice, the only such selection in draft history; he later took Sebastian Janikowski, a kicker, with the seventeenth overall pick.) Today, their presence is expected and well remunerated. Punters and kickers now make, on average, more than tight ends. Shane Lechler—again, of the Raiders—earns $3.8 million a year. Lechler punted seventy-eight times last year, meaning the Raiders shelled out nearly fifty thousand dollars for each time he stepped on the field.


Yet there is growing statistical evidence to suggest that paying punters at all is, at best, a misallocation of salary-capped funds and, at worst, counterproductive. The Times recently cited a paper by David Romer (PDF), a professor of political economy at the University of California at Berkeley, that has become “the gospel for the antipunting faction.” Romer’s determination, after studying punt data from 1998 to 2004, was that teams should never punt when facing fourth down with less than four yards to go for the first, regardless of where they are on the field. Other analysis has suggested that teams should never punt from inside their opponent’s forty-yard line. As a corollary, they should always go for a touchdown, rather than a field goal, from inside the five-yard line.


And yet football teams continue to do the opposite. Those attempting to put the data into action are stuck, for now, in the lower ranks of the game. The archetype for non-punting football has become a high-school team in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Pulaski Academy Bruins do not return punts (fumbles and penalties outweigh big returns, they say), they perform onside kicks after almost every score, and they never, ever punt. Last season, they went undefeated and won the state title. But coaches at higher levels have been slow to buy in to their system. San Diego State coach Rocky Long has said he might consider going for it on fourth down once his offense crosses midfield this season, but he’s an exception, and there are few others. Anyone that tries it puts himself at risk. In 2009, Bill Belichick opted not to punt on fourth down from his own twenty-eight-yard line, late in the game, with his team leading by six points. The statisticians came to Belichick’s defense when the play failed and the Patriots lost, but he was still roundly mocked, stats be damned. This is common. Once, when the Pulaski Bruins actually did punt, their own fans gave them a standing ovation.

Frigidus wrote:

Army of GOD wrote:

Symmetry wrote:THE CASE AGAINST PUNTING

Seems like a good idea generally to not punt on the 4th down.

Punting has been a part of football since the game’s earliest days, but it was long considered so unimportant that teams simply trained safeties or running backs to do the task. The professionalization of punting arrived in the seventies, when the Oakland Raiders selected Ray Guy, a punter, in the first round of the N.F.L. draft. (It’s fitting that Al Davis made this choice, the only such selection in draft history; he later took Sebastian Janikowski, a kicker, with the seventeenth overall pick.) Today, their presence is expected and well remunerated. Punters and kickers now make, on average, more than tight ends. Shane Lechler—again, of the Raiders—earns $3.8 million a year. Lechler punted seventy-eight times last year, meaning the Raiders shelled out nearly fifty thousand dollars for each time he stepped on the field.


Yet there is growing statistical evidence to suggest that paying punters at all is, at best, a misallocation of salary-capped funds and, at worst, counterproductive. The Times recently cited a paper by David Romer (PDF), a professor of political economy at the University of California at Berkeley, that has become “the gospel for the antipunting faction.” Romer’s determination, after studying punt data from 1998 to 2004, was that teams should never punt when facing fourth down with less than four yards to go for the first, regardless of where they are on the field. Other analysis has suggested that teams should never punt from inside their opponent’s forty-yard line. As a corollary, they should always go for a touchdown, rather than a field goal, from inside the five-yard line.


And yet football teams continue to do the opposite. Those attempting to put the data into action are stuck, for now, in the lower ranks of the game. The archetype for non-punting football has become a high-school team in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Pulaski Academy Bruins do not return punts (fumbles and penalties outweigh big returns, they say), they perform onside kicks after almost every score, and they never, ever punt. Last season, they went undefeated and won the state title. But coaches at higher levels have been slow to buy in to their system. San Diego State coach Rocky Long has said he might consider going for it on fourth down once his offense crosses midfield this season, but he’s an exception, and there are few others. Anyone that tries it puts himself at risk. In 2009, Bill Belichick opted not to punt on fourth down from his own twenty-eight-yard line, late in the game, with his team leading by six points. The statisticians came to Belichick’s defense when the play failed and the Patriots lost, but he was still roundly mocked, stats be damned. This is common. Once, when the Pulaski Bruins actually did punt, their own fans gave them a standing ovation.

This is interesting. I wonder if coaches know about this and whether or not this affects their decisions to go for it on 4th down, punt or kick a field goal.

Though, the bad thing about the statistics is that they generalize instead of accounting for (what I'd imagine to be) intangible effects such as injuries, offensive strengths of teams, etc.

Offensive strength of the team (and the defensive strength of the opposing team, really) is especially important. 4th and 3 is sometimes just an insurmountable obstacle. Then again, I mainly watch the Bears. Most of the offenses we've had in my lifetime couldn't convert a 4th and inches if their lives were on the line.

Frigidus wrote:

Army of GOD wrote:

Symmetry wrote:THE CASE AGAINST PUNTING

Seems like a good idea generally to not punt on the 4th down.

Punting has been a part of football since the game’s earliest days, but it was long considered so unimportant that teams simply trained safeties or running backs to do the task. The professionalization of punting arrived in the seventies, when the Oakland Raiders selected Ray Guy, a punter, in the first round of the N.F.L. draft. (It’s fitting that Al Davis made this choice, the only such selection in draft history; he later took Sebastian Janikowski, a kicker, with the seventeenth overall pick.) Today, their presence is expected and well remunerated. Punters and kickers now make, on average, more than tight ends. Shane Lechler—again, of the Raiders—earns $3.8 million a year. Lechler punted seventy-eight times last year, meaning the Raiders shelled out nearly fifty thousand dollars for each time he stepped on the field.


Yet there is growing statistical evidence to suggest that paying punters at all is, at best, a misallocation of salary-capped funds and, at worst, counterproductive. The Times recently cited a paper by David Romer (PDF), a professor of political economy at the University of California at Berkeley, that has become “the gospel for the antipunting faction.” Romer’s determination, after studying punt data from 1998 to 2004, was that teams should never punt when facing fourth down with less than four yards to go for the first, regardless of where they are on the field. Other analysis has suggested that teams should never punt from inside their opponent’s forty-yard line. As a corollary, they should always go for a touchdown, rather than a field goal, from inside the five-yard line.


And yet football teams continue to do the opposite. Those attempting to put the data into action are stuck, for now, in the lower ranks of the game. The archetype for non-punting football has become a high-school team in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Pulaski Academy Bruins do not return punts (fumbles and penalties outweigh big returns, they say), they perform onside kicks after almost every score, and they never, ever punt. Last season, they went undefeated and won the state title. But coaches at higher levels have been slow to buy in to their system. San Diego State coach Rocky Long has said he might consider going for it on fourth down once his offense crosses midfield this season, but he’s an exception, and there are few others. Anyone that tries it puts himself at risk. In 2009, Bill Belichick opted not to punt on fourth down from his own twenty-eight-yard line, late in the game, with his team leading by six points. The statisticians came to Belichick’s defense when the play failed and the Patriots lost, but he was still roundly mocked, stats be damned. This is common. Once, when the Pulaski Bruins actually did punt, their own fans gave them a standing ovation.

This is interesting. I wonder if coaches know about this and whether or not this affects their decisions to go for it on 4th down, punt or kick a field goal.

Though, the bad thing about the statistics is that they generalize instead of accounting for (what I'd imagine to be) intangible effects such as injuries, offensive strengths of teams, etc.

Offensive strength of the team (and the defensive strength of the opposing team, really) is especially important. 4th and 3 is sometimes just an insurmountable obstacle. Then again, I mainly watch the Bears. Most of the offenses we've had in my lifetime couldn't convert a 4th and inches if their lives were on the line.

tzor wrote:blah blah blah football

Did I mention the cheerleaders? Oh that's right, too young for this group. And I had a lot of great photos too of the girls being lifted high in the air. Too bad.

more blah blah blah football

Army of GOD wrote:

Symmetry wrote:THE CASE AGAINST PUNTING

Seems like a good idea generally to not punt on the 4th down.

Punting has been a part of football since the game’s earliest days, but it was long considered so unimportant that teams simply trained safeties or running backs to do the task. The professionalization of punting arrived in the seventies, when the Oakland Raiders selected Ray Guy, a punter, in the first round of the N.F.L. draft. (It’s fitting that Al Davis made this choice, the only such selection in draft history; he later took Sebastian Janikowski, a kicker, with the seventeenth overall pick.) Today, their presence is expected and well remunerated. Punters and kickers now make, on average, more than tight ends. Shane Lechler—again, of the Raiders—earns $3.8 million a year. Lechler punted seventy-eight times last year, meaning the Raiders shelled out nearly fifty thousand dollars for each time he stepped on the field.


Yet there is growing statistical evidence to suggest that paying punters at all is, at best, a misallocation of salary-capped funds and, at worst, counterproductive. The Times recently cited a paper by David Romer (PDF), a professor of political economy at the University of California at Berkeley, that has become “the gospel for the antipunting faction.” Romer’s determination, after studying punt data from 1998 to 2004, was that teams should never punt when facing fourth down with less than four yards to go for the first, regardless of where they are on the field. Other analysis has suggested that teams should never punt from inside their opponent’s forty-yard line. As a corollary, they should always go for a touchdown, rather than a field goal, from inside the five-yard line.


And yet football teams continue to do the opposite. Those attempting to put the data into action are stuck, for now, in the lower ranks of the game. The archetype for non-punting football has become a high-school team in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Pulaski Academy Bruins do not return punts (fumbles and penalties outweigh big returns, they say), they perform onside kicks after almost every score, and they never, ever punt. Last season, they went undefeated and won the state title. But coaches at higher levels have been slow to buy in to their system. San Diego State coach Rocky Long has said he might consider going for it on fourth down once his offense crosses midfield this season, but he’s an exception, and there are few others. Anyone that tries it puts himself at risk. In 2009, Bill Belichick opted not to punt on fourth down from his own twenty-eight-yard line, late in the game, with his team leading by six points. The statisticians came to Belichick’s defense when the play failed and the Patriots lost, but he was still roundly mocked, stats be damned. This is common. Once, when the Pulaski Bruins actually did punt, their own fans gave them a standing ovation.

This is interesting. I wonder if coaches know about this and whether or not this affects their decisions to go for it on 4th down, punt or kick a field goal.

Though, the bad thing about the statistics is that they generalize instead of accounting for (what I'd imagine to be) intangible effects such as injuries, offensive strengths of teams, etc.

Ace Rimmer wrote:

tzor wrote:blah blah blah football

Did I mention the cheerleaders? Oh that's right, too young for this group. And I had a lot of great photos too of the girls being lifted high in the air. Too bad.

more blah blah blah football

xeno and I agree, lets see the cheerleaders