Oi yoi yoi!
All Meir is saying is this, "if Israel attacks Iran, the attack could (a) spark a regional (Middle East) war, and (b) consolidate the power of Iranian Islamic Republic/Theocratic Whatever Asshole Government."
The benefits and costs of a regional war are different for individuals, and so are the BnC's of "solving internal problems" for different individuals (i.e. consolidating the Iranian government's power over its own people), so A and B, and your #1 and #2 aren't linked in the sense, which you seem to think. The regional war introduces more 'players' to the scene; whereas, the "solving internal problems" strengthens the Iranian government--domestically. They're generally separate events--but it depends...
DoomYoshi wrote:So, BBS, you are saying that statement (3) is correct but not statements (1) or (2)?
You have also claimed that (1) is correct by the blue highlight. So what evidence is there that (2) is not correct? Or are you just saying that (2) is not correct because there is no evidence for it, meaning it doesn't matter if there is evidence against it?
Basically, "(1) If: regional war then:solve internal problems" is not the primary sequence of causes here because if Israel strikes Iran, there may be a chance that Iran will kick in the nationalist furor, thus consolidating power. No regional war is necessary here.
Now, "(2)if:solve internal problems then: regional war" is the lesser likely event because Israel has struck against nearby nations, and no regional war has broken out. However, if Iran can consolidate its domestic power sufficiently, then it can divert more resources to foreign interventionist policies (e.g. funding Hezbollah and others). Meir didn't explicitly state this, but I'm sure he would agree. That could be
one avenue of "regional" war.
Another avenue is where the Arab nations rise up because they've had enough of Israel's shite (e.g. Samuel Huntington's
Clash of Civilizations, which in my opinion presumes too much). I'm not sure what Meir thinks about this possibility.
Evidence...This is just guesswork based on my small knowledge of history. If you were paying me, I'd write a more detailed, convincing report.

However, all analysts are constrained by the inadequacy of theory in this realm of social behavior, and there's that annoying problem of The Slippery Slope, where we can imagine scenarios where things get worse--but we have no way of proving its soundness. That's just how it is in foreign policy. You stick with a certain theoretical framework and roll with it (e.g.
Realism,
International Liberalism, and Idealism/that one about ideas--hearts and minds, soft power, that stuff).
If I had access to classified information, then (1) I wouldn't be willing to share it with you, but (2) I could provide more evidence for my take on the situation. Governments are simply unwilling to share such information with the public. At times, the outcome is the "Noble Lie" or plain, outright lies, or no lies at all--just incompetence, or perhaps the right thing was done. The public, the hoi polloi, will never know--until the freedom of information act kicks in, but that's still a maybe.