Free will, is it just an illusion?

[BigBallinStalin]

It certainly requires a rethink of the principles we base a criminal system on - instead of anything being about retribution the focus would have to move solely to protecting the population from a "malfunctioning unit" and trying to rehabilitate to make them a constructive part of society again where possible. It doesn't rule out just locking someone up and throwing away the key any more than the current system does.

Edit - Sam Harris does mention this at the end of the video clip but doesn't go into too much detail, it's that area I would have loved to hear more on from him...

If it does, then that should be a significant indicator of the ridiculous of determinism---especially when no evidence for it exists.

It doesn't rule out just locking someone up and throwing away the key any more than the current system does.

Why? It's determinism, so why not be logically consistent? They can't be held responsible for the unexplained events of billions of particles which inexplicably led to this outcome (the determinist just assumes so).

Determinism sounds ridiculous.

[BigBallinStalin]

The paralell that immediately springs to mind when talking about burdens of proof is with the theism/atheism debate,where IMHO theists are making an extraordinary claim that was historically overwhelmingly accepted.Perhaps in time if determinism becomes more widely accepted non-determinism will be viewed as being as extraordinary a claim as theism.

Doesn't this eliminate the concept of things such as crime? How do we punish someone for something they have no control over?

You should only feel the need to prevent people from harming others, not extract "revenge", as revenge makes no sense when there is no free will. So punishment makes sense if it is to deter others from commiting crimes or sealing away people who are deemed dangerous to society.

But punishment can't deter others from committing crimes if they don't choose to commit those crimes.

Okay so you seem unable to understand what the consequences of having no free will are. It doesn't remove your environment's ability to influence you, and that is all you need for punishment to work as determent.
Whatever "choice" you make will be the result of your lifetime experiences working together with your genetics. True independent, removed from the world of causality choice, is not needed to account for anything.

No, I'm sorry, Gillipig. Billions of particles moved around, and "you" killed "your" best friend. You don't make decisions with determinism (if they allowed for that, then their argument falls apart, since you could freely operate beyond the imagined natural laws which allegedly govern all of your behavior and outcomes). You're simply the product of the movement of particles. You are not even a "you" anymore. You're just an it, a thing, a rock--incapable of decision.

Oh, you're defining determinism as "path-depedency." Path-dependency exists, but it's not as strong as you imagine. Furthermore, it's putting cart before the horse (any event can be 'explained' as a result of path-dependency--even when the path has changed at various times).

[BigBallinStalin]

I doubt that we would ever have the computing power necessary to actually carry out the calculation. That is not the point. The point is that it is meaningful to state what the calculation is. Even if we could never actually calculate the state of the universe at t+1 based on complete information at t, it is nevertheless true (as far as we have yet determined) that the state of the universe at t+1 is completely determined by the state of the universe at t. The idea of free will requires this not to be the case. If you are meaningfully going to make a choice, then I contend it should not be possible for an external observer to know in advance what the choice will be. If that choice is completely determined by natural laws, then your mind has not done anything except play out the cosmic drama that unfolds every second in the universe.

RE: underlined,
What do you mean? Because if I knew someone really well and successfully predicted his decision (e.g. I placed a bet and won), it doesn't follow that that someone "didn't meaningfully make a choice." (Stocks and bonds traders are great at doing this for large scales of individuals and organizations). What's the difference between "knowing in advance" and "predicting"? Do you mean: "to know in advance with absolute certainty"?*

Yes, I meant to know in advance with absolute certainty (but see below).

*If absolute certainty is required, then what of the uncertainty principle? ---namely, this part: "For instance, the more precisely the position of some particle is determined, the less precisely its momentum can be known, and vice versa." (wiki)

Quantum mechanics is a deterministic system, even though it results in probabilistic outcomes for measurements. As I said, the point is not whether we could make an accurate prediction of the human's behavior. The point is to distinguish between a system where the human has made a choice, in the sense that the mind has exerted some sort of control over the environment instead of vice versa, and a system where the environment completely determined what the mind thought and did.

________________
To clarify: an atom is incapable of having free will since its "decisions" are entirely governed by natural laws. You'd agree?

Yes, and since humans are collections of atoms, it's hard for me to avoid the inevitable conclusion that humans do not have free will either.

RE: bold,
Suppose someone discovered that when x-amount of neutrinos pass through the Earth, then people are 50% more likely to desire sex. If this proven to be a fact, then would this fit your criteria of natural laws determining one's choices?

Suppose someone discovered that when x-amount of neutrinos pass through the Earth, then people are 100% more likely to desire sex. If this proven to be a fact, then would this fit your criteria of natural laws determining one's choices?

Your use of the phrase "more likely" is meaningless for this discussion, because it refers to a statistical sample and not an individual. We are discussing the individual when we discuss free will. A better question is, did the neutrinos passing through initiate some nuclear reactions that spawned a chain of events terminating in an increased desire to have sex?

I also don't believe that choice exists, at least in this framework. If the universe is deterministic, natural laws don't determine choices, they just have definite consequences. You're incorrectly describing my argument to even use the word choice, and it's resulting in an incorrect understanding of what I am saying. At the very least, you'd have to clearly define what it means for a human to make a choice.

What do you mean by "the form is completely deterministic"? Could you give an example?

Yes. According to Newton's second law, if I place a one kilogram particle on a frictionless surface and exert a force of 1 Newton on it, it will always accelerate by precisely 1 m/s^2(*). There is no element of unpredictability in what the state of the universe will be as a result of the action.

*Ignoring the effects of special relativity, which are not important for the answer.

"No element of unpredictability"....

So, you're looking for some law which completely eliminates any uncertainty* of an outcome?

*uncertainty: "uncertainty is present when the likelihood of future events is indefinite or incalculable."

Or/and are you looking for some law which perfectly defines the risk* of any means to any end?

*risk: "risk is present when future events occur with measurable probability"

I was referring to the former. There is no stochastic element to the equations that we write down that govern the universe (the uncertainty principle, for example, does not affect the determinism of Schrodinger's equation).

I am presented with two options on a broad level at this time: (1) continue reading, or (2) ignore your post. Apparently, I have more than one option. After some time of deliberating between the two choices, I chose (1).

[1]Do you really believe this? In what alternative scenario would you have made a different "choice?" [2]If the thought process that led you to the conclusion was based on some series of weighed pros and cons, those pros and cons were determined completely by your past experiences, and if we re-ran the universe again up to this point, is there any chance you could have made a different decision? If not, in what meaningful way have you actually made a choice?

[1]Given the apparent absence of a framework/model which demonstrates the validity of determinism, substitutes must be found; therefore, yes, I believe that.

It is not obvious to me why a lack of proof for determinism means that you made a choice. There are plenty of ways to construct a non-deterministic universe in which you still had no control over your actions.

[2] Sure. I could've thought of something more interesting to do, which I didn't conceive in the original, universal trial. The opportunity cost would've varied, so based upon its value compared to the perceived profit of reading his post, I may have decided either way. Who knows. Also, I don't constantly weigh pros and cons at every time for every decision, so during the second trial, I could've been entirely capricious.

I like the idea of imagining an ability to re-run the universe to test for this, but how is that practical?

If the determinist position relies on imaginary, universal reruns in order to make its case, then shouldn't it be closeted in the Unfalsifiable section--next to God, Thor, FSM, and Paramatma?

The thought process is the same for believers in free will. In order to argue that free will exists, you must argue that you could have made a different choice than the one you did (i.e., abandon crispybits' post). But why should I lend any credence to that hypothesis? The only evidence we have is what actually happened, which is that you read the post. In order to convince anyone that the result could have been different, you would need to re-run the universe with the same initial conditions and get a different outcome. That is, the burden of proof is on you. I have one piece of evidence that suggests that you would have made that choice (the evidence being that you did make that choice) and you have zero pieces of evidence suggesting that it could have happened another way. You can assert that you "could've thought of something more interesting to do," but why should I believe this has a non-zero probability?

To me, it's a ridiculous dichotomy. There's plenty of social science and various fields to explain human behavior, so I'll stick with those. This philosophical debate changes nothing, and it presents nothing but a puzzle for the sake of chasing one's tail in a puzzle. It's the same with the 'brain in the jar' arguments as well. When you find yourself arguing for universal reruns or brains in jars commanded by the Evil Great One--compared to insisting that we make the best of our current perception and theory to roll from there, then obviously settling with the former is unreasonable--especially when the criteria for demonstrating it are unfalsifiable. At the very least, you should admit "I don't know" (but you don't, which is odd).

I don't have to demonstrate anything for free will because no one has been able to provide a useful definition. Again, it's a silly dichotomy; it's unnecessary.

The only evidence we have is what actually happened, which is that you read the post.

Like this. It's nonsense. I can describe my thought process on whether or not I should respond to his post right before I make the decision. Deliberation involves balancing costs and benefits (to put it generally). Finally, a decision is made (I chose option A). This is how we use language; this is how we act. Arguing beyond that about some world hinging upon one's imagination and using unfalsifiable claims is not convincing.

You may as well doubt the existence of yourself or the floor--because How can I demonstrate otherwise? (One can keep saying that it's an illusion). Just as--I can keep explaining how I made a decision, and you keep responding with: "suppose universal reruns, or natural laws did it." (God did it). When you drop falsifiability--as you have--as your standard, then you may as well accept all other unfounded notions.

[crispybits]

OK BBS, lets try and get what your theory is in basic terms (seeing as we're unlikely to find a clean concise definition of free will). You seem to be espousing some form of dualism, is that correct? If not why?

If so, which of the particular philosophies listed on the following page describe you most closely:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_% ... of_mind%29

[Metsfanmax]

To me, it's a ridiculous dichotomy. There's plenty of social science and various fields to explain human behavior, so I'll stick with those. This philosophical debate changes nothing, and it presents nothing but a puzzle for the sake of chasing one's tail in a puzzle. It's the same with the 'brain in the jar' arguments as well. When you find yourself arguing for universal reruns or brains in jars commanded by the Evil Great One--compared to insisting that we make the best of our current perception and theory to roll from there, then obviously settling with the former is unreasonable--especially when the criteria for demonstrating it are unfalsifiable. At the very least, you should admit "I don't know" (but you don't, which is odd).

I am taking what the best of our current perception is -- namely, that the laws that govern the universe are deterministic in nature -- and rolling from there. It is you that is insisting that because your limited brain can't understand or handle what that would imply, that it is therefore false or meaningless.

Your standard is just as unfalsifiable, since there's no way to prove or disprove that you could have made a choice different than the one you did (again, since we only get one run-through of the universe). I am fine with dropping it as abstract philosophical nonsense (see below), but that doesn't mean that your standard is correct, just that it's not worth discussing -- I have already admitted that in this thread.

It's almost like you completely forgot the exchange which opened up this discussion:

Then what position would you like to argue in favor for?

None. I haven't the slightest inkling of what the mind is. I am baffled every day by the fact that "I" exist, and that "I" have thoughts. I am literally unable to wrap my mind around what my mind is. So I don't really think I have any justification for trying to go and make statements about how it works. I am just evaluating the consequences of the hypotheses that were proposed here.

[chang50]

It normally lies with those who make the positive claim - as in X exists.

In this case I think there is some on each side, but far more on the non-determinists side. The determinists claim that everything follows the laws of nature, which are determnistic and causal. Their burden of proof is already met to a large extent for them by the history and discovery of science, which has (as far as I'm aware) not found anything in this universe that exists outside of this causal structure. The last little leap of inductive reasoning is that we won't find anything in the future that does not follow these laws, so there is room for them to be wrong but not a great deal. The non-determinists on the other hand have to show the opposite, with the weight of the history and discovery of science pushing back against them. Theirs is the extraordinary claim, and so they have a much larger burden of proof.

Both people say either claim, so both need to demonstrate their evidence.

Where's the evidence for the determinists? "We may find all natural laws which explain one's decision."

Assuming reruns of the universe doesn't work. It's an unfalsifiable position!, and you ask us to counter that? How is that even acceptable?

Both positions are unfalsifiable,the evidence for determinism is neuroscience showing subconscious brain activity some seconds before we are consciously aware of making a choice.Maybe this evidence is flawed or incomplete but that is where the field is currently.Also we should consider why anything would be exempt from the chain of causality that physics tells us applies to all physical activity.If you say the activity involved with freewill exists outside the physical natural world this is an extraordinary assertion and requires evidence.How do non-determinists counter this,the burden of proof lies with their position IMHO.

[chang50]

It certainly requires a rethink of the principles we base a criminal system on - instead of anything being about retribution the focus would have to move solely to protecting the population from a "malfunctioning unit" and trying to rehabilitate to make them a constructive part of society again where possible. It doesn't rule out just locking someone up and throwing away the key any more than the current system does.

Edit - Sam Harris does mention this at the end of the video clip but doesn't go into too much detail, it's that area I would have loved to hear more on from him...

If it does, then that should be a significant indicator of the ridiculous of determinism---especially when no evidence for it exists.

It doesn't rule out just locking someone up and throwing away the key any more than the current system does.

Why? It's determinism, so why not be logically consistent? They can't be held responsible for the unexplained events of billions of particles which inexplicably led to this outcome (the determinist just assumes so).

Determinism sounds ridiculous.

Not as ridiculous as this response,Crispy quite clearly argues agin retribution (holding someone responsible),and for protecting society and rehabilitation if possible.It's undeniably there in black and white at the top of this post,what is there to misunderstand?

[BigBallinStalin]

To me, it's a ridiculous dichotomy. There's plenty of social science and various fields to explain human behavior, so I'll stick with those. This philosophical debate changes nothing, and it presents nothing but a puzzle for the sake of chasing one's tail in a puzzle. It's the same with the 'brain in the jar' arguments as well. When you find yourself arguing for universal reruns or brains in jars commanded by the Evil Great One--compared to insisting that we make the best of our current perception and theory to roll from there, then obviously settling with the former is unreasonable--especially when the criteria for demonstrating it are unfalsifiable. At the very least, you should admit "I don't know" (but you don't, which is odd).

I am taking what the best of our current perception is -- [u]namely, that the laws that govern the universe are deterministic in nature -- and rolling from there. It is you that is insisting that because your limited brain can't understand or handle what that would imply, that it is therefore false or meaningless.

Your standard is just as unfalsifiable, since there's no way to prove or disprove that you could have made a choice different than the one you did (again, since we only get one run-through of the universe). I am fine with dropping it as abstract philosophical nonsense (see below), but that doesn't mean that your standard is correct, just that it's not worth discussing -- I have already admitted that in this thread.[/u]

I strive to stick with logic and observation. Sure, it's limited (we can't run universal reruns), but it's falsifiable--with a reasonable standard. (We can ask people questions, monitor their thinking, etc.).

Here's the problem: You're holding my approach to a standard which exists in your imagination (running universal reruns), so how is that even practical? How does that even make sense?

Since running universal reruns is impossible, then why insist that such a means should be the standard for testing whether humans actually make decisions or not?

Why don't I setup a means which is impossible to test, and then conclude that the natural laws which we observe in this universe can neither be proven or disproven?
(e.g. by assuming the validity of God arguments, or multiverse theory to be true--which is equivalent to holding that the standard of running universal reruns is true).

You use a nonsensical standard, and then conclude that it's a draw. Don't you see how nonsensical that is?

It's almost like you completely forgot the exchange which opened up this discussion:

Then what position would you like to argue in favor for?

None. I haven't the slightest inkling of what the mind is. I am baffled every day by the fact that "I" exist, and that "I" have thoughts. I am literally unable to wrap my mind around what my mind is. So I don't really think I have any justification for trying to go and make statements about how it works. I am just evaluating the consequences of the hypotheses that were proposed here.

I already responded to that, and gave some sources for you to understand it. I guess you forgot.

Here's what you said following that:
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=193072&start=60#p4227139

It's related to what we've talking about. It's as if you completely forgot the exchange which followed that mind discussion.

[BigBallinStalin]

OK BBS, lets try and get what your theory is in basic terms (seeing as we're unlikely to find a clean concise definition of free will). You seem to be espousing some form of dualism, is that correct? If not why?

If so, which of the particular philosophies listed on the following page describe you most closely:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_% ... of_mind%29

Here's a means for understanding, which I use:
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=193072&start=75#p4227223
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=193072&start=60#p4227216

viewtopic.php?f=8&t=193072&start=60#p4227158
Half-way down, I address the mind v. body. No, I'm not a dualist, in the strict sense, but sure, you can split the parts from the whole to examine each in turn. I find the word, 'mind', to be a concept which fails to clarify anything, so I try not to use it.

[BigBallinStalin]

It normally lies with those who make the positive claim - as in X exists.

In this case I think there is some on each side, but far more on the non-determinists side. The determinists claim that everything follows the laws of nature, which are determnistic and causal. Their burden of proof is already met to a large extent for them by the history and discovery of science, which has (as far as I'm aware) not found anything in this universe that exists outside of this causal structure. The last little leap of inductive reasoning is that we won't find anything in the future that does not follow these laws, so there is room for them to be wrong but not a great deal. The non-determinists on the other hand have to show the opposite, with the weight of the history and discovery of science pushing back against them. Theirs is the extraordinary claim, and so they have a much larger burden of proof.

Both people say either claim, so both need to demonstrate their evidence.

Where's the evidence for the determinists? "We may find all natural laws which explain one's decision."

Assuming reruns of the universe doesn't work. It's an unfalsifiable position!, and you ask us to counter that? How is that even acceptable?

Both positions are unfalsifiable,the evidence for determinism is neuroscience showing subconscious brain activity some seconds before we are consciously aware of making a choice.Maybe this evidence is flawed or incomplete but that is where the field is currently.Also we should consider why anything would be exempt from the chain of causality that physics tells us applies to all physical activity.If you say the activity involved with freewill exists outside the physical natural world this is an extraordinary assertion and requires evidence.How do non-determinists counter this,the burden of proof lies with their position IMHO.

So "stuff moves," and therefore we don't make decisions? Please explain.

Although the elements of supernovae which exploded x-time ago are now part of you, it doesn't follow that those laws of physics say anything meaningful about your present-day actions (e.g. your response). The determinism which Mets explains would want to say otherwise (but it can't because it has so far nothing to show for it).

[crispybits]

OK BBS, lets try and get what your theory is in basic terms (seeing as we're unlikely to find a clean concise definition of free will). You seem to be espousing some form of dualism, is that correct? If not why?

If so, which of the particular philosophies listed on the following page describe you most closely:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_% ... of_mind%29

Here's a means for understanding, which I use:
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=193072&start=75#p4227223
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=193072&start=60#p4227216
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=193072&start=60#p4227158
Half-way down, I address the mind v. body. No, I'm not a dualist, in the strict sense, but sure, you can split the parts from the whole to examine each in turn. I find the word, 'mind', to be a concept which fails to clarify anything, so I try not to use it.

Looking at those posts whether you admit it or not you are heading right into a metaphysically dualist position.

Maybe the ultra-exogenous would be physical rules that govern our bodies--e.g. the desire to eat (for nearly all people). But then, how do you compare these ultra-exogenous factors with the semi-exogenous/endogenous ones? I simply keep them separate, so I'd distinguish between your "laws of physics" argument and the "non-laws of physics" aspect, and conclude: "laws of physics" constrain our options, so we still room to choose.

If you argue that there is a section of "us" that is not constrained by the laws of physics then you're arguing for dualism.

You’re separating an individual from his brain, thus pitting them as two different ‘decision-making’ ‘entities’ against each other. One, the brain, is the conscious decision-maker, and the other, the… body? is the unconscious decision-maker. I = body, and brain = ???. No, the mind, body, and brain are connected, and to me serve as one whole, which I define as “one’s self” or “me.”

No I'm not, I'm saying that there is one thing, "me", that is controlled not only by my brain but also the other biological needs of my body, and that single "me" is like a very complex computer/machine which runs (in most people, we'll disregard mental illness here for now) in a way that it tries to maximise the chances of getting things like food and sex and whatever else makes us happy and fulfilled, but is bound entirely by cause and effect.

If you want to contend that alongside the purely physical machine element there exists some other sort of thing, the conciousness or mind or whatever we call it, which is not bound by the laws of physics and can violate constraints as long as those constraints aren't impossible things like jumping all the way to the moon or whatever then you should be able to demonstrate at least one other thing in nature that acts in this non-deterministic way. Everything we see around us acts via cause and effect, and it's a big claim to suggest that our bodies and brains and minds act in a non-cause and effect way in any limited regard at all, even 0.0000001% kinda levels.

"Necessity" to me means 'necessary'. For example, one must eat food---assuming they wish to live. That's a physiological constraint. Another is: everyone's intelligence differs; therefore, some have greater ability in shaping their futures, surroundings, and themselves compared to others. That's a physiological constraint.

I'm saying that these two types of constraint work in exactly the same way and are effectively the same things. Psychological constraints told you not to spit on the last person you passed in the street even though that is possible, but just because it's possible and you didn't do it doesn't mean that it's a qualitatively different kind of constraint. You didn't do it because acting like that in society would lead to a decrease in your chances of getting good quality food, sex, etc (whatever makes you happy) and therefore you are hardwired against it. This illusion of control you have over that decision is a retrospective trick of the mind - did you make a concious decision not to spit the last time you passed someone in the street or did the thought never even enter your concious mind?

[chang50]

It normally lies with those who make the positive claim - as in X exists.

In this case I think there is some on each side, but far more on the non-determinists side. The determinists claim that everything follows the laws of nature, which are determnistic and causal. Their burden of proof is already met to a large extent for them by the history and discovery of science, which has (as far as I'm aware) not found anything in this universe that exists outside of this causal structure. The last little leap of inductive reasoning is that we won't find anything in the future that does not follow these laws, so there is room for them to be wrong but not a great deal. The non-determinists on the other hand have to show the opposite, with the weight of the history and discovery of science pushing back against them. Theirs is the extraordinary claim, and so they have a much larger burden of proof.

Both people say either claim, so both need to demonstrate their evidence.

Where's the evidence for the determinists? "We may find all natural laws which explain one's decision."

Assuming reruns of the universe doesn't work. It's an unfalsifiable position!, and you ask us to counter that? How is that even acceptable?

Both positions are unfalsifiable,the evidence for determinism is neuroscience showing subconscious brain activity some seconds before we are consciously aware of making a choice.Maybe this evidence is flawed or incomplete but that is where the field is currently.Also we should consider why anything would be exempt from the chain of causality that physics tells us applies to all physical activity.If you say the activity involved with freewill exists outside the physical natural world this is an extraordinary assertion and requires evidence.How do non-determinists counter this,the burden of proof lies with their position IMHO.

So "stuff moves," and therefore we don't make decisions? Please explain.

Although the elements of supernovae which exploded x-time ago are now part of you, it doesn't follow that those laws of physics say anything meaningful about your present-day actions (e.g. your response). The determinism which Mets explains would want to say otherwise (but it can't because it has so far nothing to show for it).

Determinism may or may not be correct but it deserves to be taken seriously.The thesis as I understand it is that we don't make conscious choices,counter -intuitive as that seems to many,including myself at first.In order to refute this you have to provide evidence for anything existing outside the chain of causality,good luck with that.

[Metsfanmax]

I strive to stick with logic and observation. Sure, it's limited (we can't run universal reruns), but it's falsifiable--with a reasonable standard. (We can ask people questions, monitor their thinking, etc.).

Here's the problem: You're holding my approach to a standard which exists in your imagination (running universal reruns), so how is that even practical? How does that even make sense?

Since running universal reruns is impossible, then why insist that such a means should be the standard for testing whether humans actually make decisions or not?

Why don't I setup a means which is impossible to test, and then conclude that the natural laws which we observe in this universe can neither be proven or disproven?
(e.g. by assuming the validity of God arguments, or multiverse theory to be true--which is equivalent to holding that the standard of running universal reruns is true).

You use a nonsensical standard, and then conclude that it's a draw. Don't you see how nonsensical that is?

You've latched on to a single thought experiment I proposed and are now laying everything you've got into it -- but it's not actually the main reason why determinism as a theory has validity. I never said that the universal re-run test is that crucial to my understanding of how things work -- it's just a way to think about the subject. This seems to be an effective straw man for you, but it's not too relevant. The bottom line is that I lean towards determinism because of logic and observation. The question at hand is, is it more likely that the universe is deterministic or non-deterministic? In the deterministic column, I see that every law of nature we have thus far discovered can be written in deterministic form. In the non-deterministic column, I have nothing except for that it lays waste to our understanding of human identity (which, while saddening and/or unfortunate to our ego, is no worse a blow than what geology and cosmology have done to lay waste to the creationist perspective, and isn't actually a statement of truth or falsehood). To me, the logical choice is to not disregard millennia of human progress in understanding the universe. Your perspective is equivalent to saying "I know that everything we have learned about science points towards determinism, but I just don't understand how it could apply to the human mind, so I'm going to ignore it." If anything reminds me of the way that religious people view the world, it is that.

It's almost like you completely forgot the exchange which opened up this discussion:

Then what position would you like to argue in favor for?

None. I haven't the slightest inkling of what the mind is. I am baffled every day by the fact that "I" exist, and that "I" have thoughts. I am literally unable to wrap my mind around what my mind is. So I don't really think I have any justification for trying to go and make statements about how it works. I am just evaluating the consequences of the hypotheses that were proposed here.

I already responded to that, and gave some sources for you to understand it. I guess you forgot.

Here's what you said following that:
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=193072&start=60#p4227139

It's related to what we've talking about. It's as if you completely forgot the exchange which followed that mind discussion.

How this conversation has went:

BBS: What theory do you believe about the mind?
Mets: I don't know how the mind works. I'd rather not take a stance.
BBS: OK, but really, take a stance.
Mets: OK, I guess if I have to, I'd lean towards determinism based on what I know about science.
BBS: Haha, gotcha! Determinism is wrong. You should have said you just don't know.

[chang50]

Apologies for ressurecting this old thread but it was starting to intrude into another thread and BBS suggested posts should be directed to the relevant thread.My question to BBS is the same as Gillipig's,which he has so far failed to respond to.What is it that exempts the firing of neurons in the brain from the chain of causality that governs all actions stretching back to the big bang?
Theists are also invited to answer this as freewill is basic to their belief..

[BigBallinStalin]

You can describe a chain of events, such as neurons firing in such a way and then stretch your story all the way to the big bang, but it doesn't follow that the big bang caused you to drink 7/8ths of a cup of coffee at 5AM this morning.

[chang50]

You can describe a chain of events, such as neurons firing in such a way and then stretch your story all the way to the big bang, but it doesn't follow that the big bang caused you to drink 7/8ths of a cup of coffee at 5AM this morning.

I don't think anyone has said it did,at least not directly.The question is why this occurrence of neurons firing should be different from all other occurrences that are part of the chain of causality.If you believe in freewill you should at least have a tentative explaination of how it works using the scientific method.

[BigBallinStalin]

My previous response is how I view 'hard' determinism.

To recap, I don't find the distinction of free will v. determinism to be useful. Humans are not totally independent of the functions of their automatic nervous system, so in this sense some range of their actions are determined by the structure of and changes within their brains. Nor are humans totally independent of the law of physics/laws of natural sciences, e.g. humans on Earth can't jump 30 feet into the air. In this sense, some part of our total range of actions are determined. Finally, the institutions of societies (informal and formal 'rules of the game') reinforce incentives toward certain actions (e.g. morality, religion, marriage, the Law, economic rules, etc.), thereby somewhat determining the range of human actions.

However, the free will aspect also plays a role in this. Institutions are not exogenous (i.e. externally imposed and fixed). Instead, institutions are endogenous--i.e. the individuals operating within various institutions can also change those institutions. And conflicting institutions give rise to 'institutional resolution'--i.e. institutions do change by actions of humans. Sometimes, the changes are conscious and intentional (thus involve free will) and other times the outcomes are the result of human action but not of human design (a.k.a. spontaneous order), thus are not intentional and are not quite deterministic either. Outcomes of spontaneous order don't fit neatly into the determinist v. free will classification, which limits the usefulness of that distinction.

Likewise, humans have some scope of voluntarily and consciously changing (thus conflicting with) the 'determining' aspect of their brains and of the natural laws. For example, some humans can successfully diet; some reap the benefits of meditation; change can occur through therapy, etc. So, the seemingly one-sided, thus 'monocausal', determinism from the brain can actually become bicausal (i.e. endogenous). Another example of humans 'breaking free' of the determinism of natural laws is by inventing an airplane. Relative to the non-airplane age, humans were limited in flight by jumping or throwing themselves from high cliffs.

As the limits of determinism become reduced, then the determinists can simply scale back their position. For example, 'oh, but humans with flight are still constrained by gravity and what not'. Right, right, but it can't be denied that the range of human actions has expanded relative to the previous range which encompassed the determinist portion. This tactic reminds me of the 'god of the gaps' scenario.

tl;dr
The philosophic discussion on free will v. determinism has been exhausted, or rather has hit very low marginal returns. Eventually, neuroscience and other social sciences will slowly clarify those ranges/boundaries of the determining and of 'free will'/the endogenous. However, the other aspect, spontaneous order, throws another puzzle into this endeavor. In short, the existence of spontaneous order and the endogenous relationship of seemingly pure determinist systems requires us to drop the free will v. determinist distinction and instead seek a more accurate way of categorizing human activities and the outcomes of human action.

Free will does exist but within some range of total human actions--just as determinism exists but within the remaining range of total human actions. And the existence of intentional, conscious design (making airplanes, creating new therapeutic techniques) and the existence of unintentional outcomes of human actions (spontaneous order) alter the boundaries of free will and of determinism. Neither side can claim total victory in this debate.

[BigBallinStalin]

It normally lies with those who make the positive claim - as in X exists.

In this case I think there is some on each side, but far more on the non-determinists side. The determinists claim that everything follows the laws of nature, which are determnistic and causal. Their burden of proof is already met to a large extent for them by the history and discovery of science, which has (as far as I'm aware) not found anything in this universe that exists outside of this causal structure. The last little leap of inductive reasoning is that we won't find anything in the future that does not follow these laws, so there is room for them to be wrong but not a great deal. The non-determinists on the other hand have to show the opposite, with the weight of the history and discovery of science pushing back against them. Theirs is the extraordinary claim, and so they have a much larger burden of proof.

Both people say either claim, so both need to demonstrate their evidence.

Where's the evidence for the determinists? "We may find all natural laws which explain one's decision."

Assuming reruns of the universe doesn't work. It's an unfalsifiable position!, and you ask us to counter that? How is that even acceptable?

Both positions are unfalsifiable,the evidence for determinism is neuroscience showing subconscious brain activity some seconds before we are consciously aware of making a choice.Maybe this evidence is flawed or incomplete but that is where the field is currently.Also we should consider why anything would be exempt from the chain of causality that physics tells us applies to all physical activity.If you say the activity involved with freewill exists outside the physical natural world this is an extraordinary assertion and requires evidence.How do non-determinists counter this,the burden of proof lies with their position IMHO.

So "stuff moves," and therefore we don't make decisions? Please explain.

Although the elements of supernovae which exploded x-time ago are now part of you, it doesn't follow that those laws of physics say anything meaningful about your present-day actions (e.g. your response). The determinism which Mets explains would want to say otherwise (but it can't because it has so far nothing to show for it).

Determinism may or may not be correct but it deserves to be taken seriously.The thesis as I understand it is that we don't make conscious choices,counter -intuitive as that seems to many,including myself at first.In order to refute this you have to provide evidence for anything existing outside the chain of causality,good luck with that.

So, this is why I don't find this kind of determinist position to be useful. The existence of endogeneity requires an approach beyond a 'chain of causality' thinking. Instead, we don't have a chain, but rather a feedback loop where the individuals within the system respond to the incentives created by the system--but also those individuals can change the overall system, thereby altering the previously 'determinist' system. Sometimes, the feedback loop of one institution/system can become entirely broken when a new institution is created (e.g. switching from totalitarianism to democracy).

There will always be some higher constraint which 'determines'* human action--e.g. gravity, or some sequence of events in the cosmos, but in order to make a relevant observation of human action, I'd require some explanation that demonstrates how some sequence of events 'caused' human action A. For example, in order to provide a useful explanation of human behavior from the determinist perspective, the determinist would have to demonstrate how the big bang caused me to drink 7/8ths of a cup of coffee at 5AM this morning. It's a huge undertaking which is too costly demonstrate, thus the support for the determinist position dwindles--or rather, a substitute for the determinist v. free will approach becomes necessary.

So, in the meantime, we'll have to deal with spontaneous order, endogeneity, and exogeneity through the social scientific approaches while neuroscience/psychology can slowly uncover the range of the determinist aspects of our brains.

*'determines' is not a sufficiently accurate word. Rather 'constrains' makes more sense.

[chang50]

It normally lies with those who make the positive claim - as in X exists.

In this case I think there is some on each side, but far more on the non-determinists side. The determinists claim that everything follows the laws of nature, which are determnistic and causal. Their burden of proof is already met to a large extent for them by the history and discovery of science, which has (as far as I'm aware) not found anything in this universe that exists outside of this causal structure. The last little leap of inductive reasoning is that we won't find anything in the future that does not follow these laws, so there is room for them to be wrong but not a great deal. The non-determinists on the other hand have to show the opposite, with the weight of the history and discovery of science pushing back against them. Theirs is the extraordinary claim, and so they have a much larger burden of proof.

Both people say either claim, so both need to demonstrate their evidence.

Where's the evidence for the determinists? "We may find all natural laws which explain one's decision."

Assuming reruns of the universe doesn't work. It's an unfalsifiable position!, and you ask us to counter that? How is that even acceptable?

Both positions are unfalsifiable,the evidence for determinism is neuroscience showing subconscious brain activity some seconds before we are consciously aware of making a choice.Maybe this evidence is flawed or incomplete but that is where the field is currently.Also we should consider why anything would be exempt from the chain of causality that physics tells us applies to all physical activity.If you say the activity involved with freewill exists outside the physical natural world this is an extraordinary assertion and requires evidence.How do non-determinists counter this,the burden of proof lies with their position IMHO.

So "stuff moves," and therefore we don't make decisions? Please explain.

Although the elements of supernovae which exploded x-time ago are now part of you, it doesn't follow that those laws of physics say anything meaningful about your present-day actions (e.g. your response). The determinism which Mets explains would want to say otherwise (but it can't because it has so far nothing to show for it).

Determinism may or may not be correct but it deserves to be taken seriously.The thesis as I understand it is that we don't make conscious choices,counter -intuitive as that seems to many,including myself at first.In order to refute this you have to provide evidence for anything existing outside the chain of causality,good luck with that.

So, this is why I don't find this kind of determinist position to be useful. The existence of endogeneity requires an approach beyond a 'chain of causality' thinking. Instead, we don't have a chain, but rather a feedback loop where the individuals within the system respond to the incentives created by the system--but also those individuals can change the overall system, thereby altering the previously 'determinist' system. Sometimes, the feedback loop of one institution/system can become entirely broken when a new institution is created (e.g. switching from totalitarianism to democracy).

There will always be some higher constraint which 'determines'* human action--e.g. gravity, or some sequence of events in the cosmos, but in order to make a relevant observation of human action, I'd require some explanation that demonstrates how some sequence of events 'caused' human action A. For example, in order to provide a useful explanation of human behavior from the determinist perspective, the determinist would have to demonstrate how the big bang caused me to drink 7/8ths of a cup of coffee at 5AM this morning. It's a huge undertaking which is too costly demonstrate, thus the support for the determinist position dwindles--or rather, a substitute for the determinist v. free will approach becomes necessary.

So, in the meantime, we'll have to deal with spontaneous order, endogeneity, and exogeneity through the social scientific approaches while neuroscience/psychology can slowly uncover the range of the determinist aspects of our brains.

*'determines' is not a sufficiently accurate word. Rather 'constrains' makes more sense.

So we have an exception to the chain of causality,a feedback loop as you posit,which has to be non-physical to be exempt from the chain of causality.This explains nothing until you can show on a non- physical level how individuals consciously respond to the incentives created by the system.Of course individuals can change the overall system,the point at issue is whether they can do it consciously.I admit I don't know which thesis is correct,but it is obvious you have failed to demonstrate the existence of freewill as you cannot demonstrate the existence of non-physical action necessary to stop the chain of causality.

[BigBallinStalin]

Prices provide that example. People respond to them all the time. Their actions reinforce certain institutions--e.g. market institutions. We've seen this over the course of human history... You make decisions in regard to prices consciously whenever you go to the grocery store--or whenever you decide to buy X instead of Y. Of course, some purchasing decisions can be pretty much automatic--e.g. some people push a button on any drink machine because they don't care to expend additional units of time/thinking/etc in order to determine what best maximizes their utility. "Pepsi, Dr Pepper, whatever," bam <button pushed, out comes a drink>.

Institutions, which are one form of a system, can be changed consciously. Legislators and bureaucrats via public policy do this all the time (e.g. ACA). The culture within a business changes likewise due to the owners over the decision rights.

To be clear, the 'system' doesn't create anything. The fundamental unit in the realm of human action is the individual, and those individuals who exercise the decision rights over whatever is at play (like purchasing goods, implementing policy) affect other individuals within their scope of operation. For example, when enough people decide that the Chevy Volt is a piece of crap, then it may no longer be profitable for Chevrolet to continue that line of production. Faced with different prices, thus different values of several cars, an individual chooses one car at the opportunity cost of not choosing the second most valued car (e.g. the Volt). Faced with a loss (thus an incentive), Chevrolet responds.

And remember, I'm not arguing for either free will or determinism because that distinction is not useful--as I've already explained. My position doesn't rely on something being non-physical. Prices are a concept but they are reflected in reality in terms of dollars--in real terms, prices reflect labor-hours.

[chang50]

Prices provide that example. People respond to them all the time. Their actions reinforce certain institutions--e.g. market institutions. We've seen this over the course of human history... You make decisions in regard to prices consciously whenever you go to the grocery store--or whenever you decide to buy X instead of Y. Of course, some purchasing decisions can be pretty much automatic--e.g. some people push a button on any drink machine because they don't care to expend additional units of time/thinking/etc in order to determine what best maximizes their utility. "Pepsi, Dr Pepper, whatever," bam <button pushed, out comes a drink>.

Institutions, which are one form of a system, can be changed consciously. Legislators and bureaucrats via public policy do this all the time (e.g. ACA). The culture within a business changes likewise due to the owners over the decision rights.

To be clear, the 'system' doesn't create anything. The fundamental unit in the realm of human action is the individual, and those individuals who exercise the decision rights over whatever is at play (like purchasing goods, implementing policy) affect other individuals within their scope of operation. For example, when enough people decide that the Chevy Volt is a piece of crap, then it may no longer be profitable for Chevrolet to continue that line of production. Faced with different prices, thus different values of several cars, an individual chooses one car at the opportunity cost of not choosing the second most valued car (e.g. the Volt). Faced with a loss (thus an incentive), Chevrolet responds.

And remember, I'm not arguing for either free will or determinism because that distinction is not useful--as I've already explained. My position doesn't rely on something being non-physical. Prices are a concept but they are reflected in reality in terms of dollars--in real terms, prices reflect labor-hours.

We're talking past each other.Either I've totally missed what you are trying to say or vice-versa..

[BigBallinStalin]

Let's try again. What are your criteria for determinism? In other words, how do you know that you are observing determinism?

[chang50]

Let's try again. What are your criteria for determinism? In other words, how do you know that you are observing determinism?

Are we talking about causal determinism only?

[BigBallinStalin]

Let's try again. What are your criteria for determinism? In other words, how do you know that you are observing determinism?

Are we talking about causal determinism only?

However you wish to define determinism, then go for it.