sax wrote:There is absolutely nothing to restrain Israeli military action in the Levant now - Syria's chemical weapons were the only deterrent to Israeli military action in the region.
...
(Of course that may happen anyway and the FSA, et. al. are in for a rude surprise when the west pulls the carpet out from underneath and stops the gravy train once Syrian CW are gone.)
Sax, you forget. Russia holds
a wild card: Iran, and Syria still remains a potentially profitable tool for projecting US interests since the diminishing of the CW deterrent may not prove rewarding enough.
Iran will continue developing its nuclear weapons which will deter Israel (marginally) from expanding its power in that region. Depending on the (1) power of Iran's nuclear constraint and (2) the attrition of Iranian/Iranian-trained and subsidized forces (e.g. Hezbollah, Hamas, Fatah, and Co.) Israel's regional power can increase, decrease, or remain constant.*
- *Assuming (a) Israel does not significantly attain peace with Palestine---which in my opinion would strongly encourage Hamas to expand its economic base, thereby expanding its military spending and production. Also, (b) the US military budget will not be significantly reduced.
Also, Russia controls the levers on a large portion of the oil/natty gas imports to Europe, so this implicit deterrent may serve as some constraint on the European NATO forces, thereby possibly decreasing US/Israeli power projection into the ME region. (Of course, a decrease in this supply could be fulfilled by in an increase in supply from non-Russians sources, but these sources would expectantly come at a higher price. In short, it depends on how the millions of Europeans economize on their use of these energy sources).
So,
the next play in US--aside from flipping Syria to a pro-US government, is (1) to deal with Iran's power projection and (2) to increase non-Russian controlled/influenced oil and natty gas imports to Europe.
I expect the US to continue or to expand its Special Forces operations in the Syrian region, plus its CIA ops of subsidizing rebels while drone striking other rebels/government officials. Why? Because terrorism!!1 and the US electorate doesn't care enough or isn't aware of such operations--[insert "national security/interests" rhetoric]), and finally because having a pro-US Syria is much more useful and possibly attainable compared to having an unknown/anti-US Syria. [/pro-US Syria].
Now (1). Constraining Iran depends on future US relations with Israel, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, and maybe Syria and to the least degree Egypt. These respective countries are also bogged down with domestic issues (economic and military), so their degree of support in US' efforts against Iran will vary. With continued US subsidies to these countries, influence could be curried, thus future forces could be used against Iran in a most likely supportive role (defense, intelligence, infrastructure/logistics, AA positioning--especially missile defense systems (MDS)).
Constraint also depends on interdiction (e.g. enforcing economic embargoes by
violent threats diplomacy and by
theft confiscation, as well as pressuring others to decrease/cease Iranian imports).
Increase non-Russian oil/natty gas imports to Europe:
It depends on whether or not the market can be made more competitive by dealing with the Kurd-Iraqis, Other Iraqis, and many other big time supplies and investors of capital in completing the Syrian pipeline which would flow directly into Turkey, thereby into Europe at a lower price (thanks, patches, very interesting analysis).
There's way too many variables in this. Other governments (OPEC) may be disinclined to supply more to Europe, thereby lowering the prices (which depends on quantity demanded after this increase in supply). And given the many innovations and other nuances of exchange and production in the market, the USG will have a difficult time going this route--which is why it opts toward violence/empire in these matters, thus (1) will be their main course.
