Baron Von PWN wrote:BigBallinStalin wrote:Across the board cuts (at the same rates) aren't the best way of reducing government expenditures, but what's a more practical (and actually implementable) standard of cutting?
Politicians who favor program A will want a proportional cut in other programs if their own program has to be cut. It's political compromise, which results in stupid consequences.
The most reasonable way to cut government is targeted cuts. "Do we need a ministry of silly walks? no. no we don't Let's cut that ministry" or even cutting specific programs within a certain ministry. That's more effective than having a bunch of under funded government agencies.
I understand what you're getting at that institutional entrenchment and bureaucracies will resist that. What's needed is sufficiently formidable political will ( I don't think this is present in the USA atm).
Exactly, which goes to the heart of this matter. But why do the politicians lack that will?
Because the government can continue borrowing on the cheap (10-year US treasury securites @
1.83%). Imagine getting a student loan at that rate! Continued deficit spending becomes the "path of the least political resistance." Their incentive is to 'kick the can down the road,' and the political institution rewards such behavior (it becomes reinforcing).
And without specific and enforceable conditions set on borrowing this money, then not much will happen until something significant strongly changes their incentives. (lol @ the thought of having the government enforcing conditions on itself).
RE: bureaucraciesAll bureaucracies can be labeled as underfunded because they adhere to the incentive which rewards their ability to overestimate their capabilities---"if only they were given more cash, they'd be able to perform better!" "The Bureau of Silly Walks provides valuable research which based on our economists' estimates will improve social welfare by 11.2% over the next 5 years. You can't cut our funding!"
There's also the consequence where if revenue is cut, one must become more efficient. That's how profit and loss incentives work, but with bureaucratic and political incentives, you won't get similar outcomes in efficiency. Nevertheless, it does induce them to become more efficient (e.g. Pentagon must do more will less, as in it can't fund unnecessary projects like the F-35, which of course was deemed necessary by the Pentagon.
Baron Von PWN wrote:Eastern Europe's transition from command economies would actually be a good case study of how to go about enacting budget cuts. They all went about it different ways and I think there has been a decently significant amount of time to properly study it (there's a wealth of research into it already).
Yeah, "development economics." The WB and the IMF churn out loads of data on this.