BigBallinStalin wrote:Ray Rider wrote:Looks like the antiwar crowd is dominating the discussion here and I happen to agree for the most part. The National Post had a good article about it recently
here.
However I do have a couple questions for the non-interventionists here:
1. At what point is intervention in sovereign nation's civil war justifiable, or is it ever justifiable, in your opinion? In the case of Syria, it's of low strategic value to the West, neither warring faction shares the West's values, and the risk of the war spilling over to other nations is low if left to continue its course; however do you believe there is a point, say after 500,000 causalities or something
, that intervention is morally just and necessary from a humanitarian standpoint? Or perhaps only if it is ethnic cleansing which is occurring i.e. Rwanda?
No, but this is a incomplete view of the situation. It's not just simply: after x-amount of people die by (a) Assad's government--and also (b) various rebels, then war is morally justified. (Who's killing who, and why?) Given one's moral position, would intervention
achieve the goal of stopping the casualties or would it increase it? And how would intervention be conducted?
Means, Ends, Outcomes We must first understand if the means, (a) intervention or non-intervention, attain the goals of our moral position, and more importantly, this requires comparing the various means with alternatives--e.g. letting Syrian refugees into the US. *(Watch how some moralists would bulk at that proposition. They'd want to 'help' but at the distance of a missile strike, which to me says something about their moral 'reasoning'). Wouldn't extended visas to Syrian refugees minimize more casualties?, and upon arrival, wouldn't the work/trade benefit them and us even more? The relative benefits and costs of intervention must be compared with the relative benefits and costs of non-intervention.
(b) Then, we have to consider the intended and unintended consequences for the means, and this requires looking at the past pattern of US intervention in (1) resolving conflict, thus (2) preventing more deaths, and (3) providing better/worse long-term outcomes (all of which the US + Allies have had a very unimpressive record).
Also, if we answer (a) intervention, you'd have to (c) examine the political process in order to clarify one's expectations of the outcomes from US policymakers and politicians. For example, of the many plans for intervention, and regardless of the pro-war clamoring of the electorate, would the USG
actually pick the one which minimizes casualties in the long-run? (which would presumably be the goal of the initial moral claim). Or would they pick something else? (e.g. supporting a dictatorship, 'accidentally' prolonging the war, etc.). If they would pick something else, then why support intervention?
(Notice how moral rhetoric/'reasoning' can have zero accountability because that approach often overlooks consequences of its clamoring, and it fails to explain the process through which the moral means would be implemented).
Reevaluate the moral positionAre casualties all that matters? Suppose the US were to impose a dictatorship in Syria which actually keep casualties at a lower rate. Would it be acceptable for a moral position to inadvertently support dictatorships? Are there not other criteria for moral approbation (e.g. freedom, health, well-being, etc.)? If so, would the various means of intervention be better at attaining such lofty goals, or would the various means of non-intervention be more effective? For example, compare building a democracy (Iraq, AFG) to simply inviting people to an already established democracy (e.g. opening borders of US, CAN, wherever to innocent Syrians).
So, we can't just rely on the casualties nor on the means of those casualties as a reason for intervention.
Moral Positioning: subsidies, accountability, and opportunity costWho's going to subsidize/pay the costs for one's moral position? And would such a process accurately reflect your consideration of the costs and benefits over time? Again, how would the moralist hold himself accountable if his means for attaining his moral goal not only fail but create even worse outcomes?
Let's apply what we know about the importance of opportunity costs. Since we live in a world of scarcity, we have finite means for attaining many desired goals. Suppose an intervention in Syria would cost
$1bn per month. If one's moral goal is to reduce deaths, then would spending $1bn per month on other means better attain that goal?--e.g. foreign aid, R&D in medicine, whatever. In other words, for any plan of action, you should compare it to the opportunity cost--i.e. what could you have spent the money on instead.
And if spending $1bn per month on Whatever could've saved more lives, then how can one justify an intervention in Syria? Do not other people's lives matter as well?
Then, what happens in the political process of subsidizing one's moral goals? If you don't pay for something--or to be precise, if you only pay a relatively minimal amount than you otherwise would have had to pay (since everyone else is being force to pay), nor control the decision rights over that money, then you'll have a limited ability to attain your goal.
Suppose you could freely spend your money on intervention (military/non-military) in Syria. If your place of donation was failing to attain its goals, you could stop giving it money. The problem with the political process is that (1) you can't choose to stop giving it money--no matter how much it fails, and (2) political enterprises don't go bankrupt, so when they fail, they neither learn as effectively as businesses in the market system learn, nor we will they be forced to actually stop or rapidly decrease doing harm--in most cases.
Also, if you subsidize something, you generally get more of it. If you subsidize the means for intervention, then the price for moral clamoring toward intervention would decrease (it's encapsulated in the thought: "hey, we got the military, so why not use it as 'a global force for good'" Why not 'do something'?). The problem is that a subsidy in the political process doesn't hold itself accountable to waste/lower productivity--compared to 'subsidies'/investments in the market system. (Recall the paragraph above on why that is).
And, is it more right for others' to die--like Allied/rebels/Syrian govt. soldiers/innocents? Is it more right to deprive others' of more of their money (taxation)? Your moral concerns
might be assuaged, but are you choosing and attaining the best moral means and goals?
('might' because the goal through intervention is not certain, nor highly likely given past performance).
Given all this, would the moralist hold himself accountable to all the above problems? Or do they generally shout for X, get X, and then move onto Y while ignoring X? (If so, then they should stop doing that since no accountability doesn't help others in the long-run). If one supports intervention, and it fails or causes more harm, then is the moralist punished for supporting such means? No, hardly. Would they learn from their mistakes? Maybe. If so, then moral clamoring for intervention shouldn't be subsidized.
Those who insist on intervention should be required to face the consequences of their actions--whether it be joining the war and getting shot, or supporting military/non-military intervention through donations while watching that money become poorly used. That's how people are best held accountable: when the costs of their actions are internalized. (The political process does not encourage this since its means are almost entirely provided through involuntary exchange--i.e. each citizen hardly has as much autonomy over the political means, compared to one's autonomy on making decisions in markets).
